Relation between India and Pakistan :

I. Introduction :

It is true that a nation can choose its friends but cannot choose its neighbors. India and Pakistan are neighbors with complex problems with each other; that cannot be simply washed away or be forcefully settled down. Ideology, history and geo-politics remained permanent markers in the relations between India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan were birthed out of a bloody partition that encouraged each to define itself in opposition to the other. Six decades after the tragedy and trauma of partition, a host of issues continue to bedevil India-Pakistan relations and cast long shadows on bilateral ties. Pakistan perceives that India has hegemonic ambition in South Asia. Pakistan is the primary bargainers, has the potential to check Indian dominance or hegemonic aspirations. Pakistan is neither strong enough to assert itself effectively against India nor it is so weak that it can readily submit in a subordinate position. Immediately after partition, there was a lot of confidence in Pakistan that the Muslim countries of the world would draw closer to Pakistan and indeed might move towards a Pan-Islamic grouping of Muslim nations. Islam and Muslim brotherhood appeared to Pakistan the only bond of belonging in whose name she could appeal for other nation’s support against India.

 II. Pakistan’s Security and Nuclear policy

Since the inception of Pakistan, its main focus has been on national security. Pakistan started its journey as an independent country with a sense of insecurity and a perceived threat from its dominant and rival neighbouring India. Since the beginning, Pakistan’s decision makers perceived a major threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity from India’s superior military capacity and economic power. Pakistan’s foreign policy has been conditioned by two interrelated factors i.e., the fear of India and an urge to seek a strategic balance with India. For this purpose, Pakistan joined the United Stated military alliance- South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in 1954, followed by its entry into the Bagdad Pact (later CEATO) in 1955, to enhance its own security potential, to escape the nightmare of being crushed by India.

Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is deeply rooted in its political thinking. The leadership in Islamabad has definitely perceived nuclear weapon as an ultimate guarantor of Pakistan’s national survival. Pakistan perceives that India will attack Pakistan, grab territory, split the country or undo partition. The threat became real when India got directly involved in the 1971 crisis aimed to dismember Pakistan. Pakistan lost 340.38 square miles of its territory to India; while India lost only 58.38 square miles to Pakistan. After the 1971 war with India, Pakistan became more sensitive for its security issues.

III. The Kashmir Dispute :

South Asia is undoubtedly one of the most war-prone regions in the world with two neighbours engaged in unresolved conflict over Kashmir. Kashmir dispute has created special bitterness in the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, more than anything else. The geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan is rooted in the 1947 communal partition of the subcontinent. For India, Kashmir is an integral part of its union, while for Pakistan, Kashmir is a disputed land. For Pakistan, Kashmir with its Muslim majority state should have acceded to Pakistan according to two nation theory. It describes the Kashmir as an ‘unfinished agenda of partition’ of the subcontinent in 1947, viz. that the contiguous Muslim-majority areas, like Kashmir, would constitute Pakistan. On the other hand, India is rejecting the philosophy of partition, namely, separation on the basis of religion. However it needs to be highlighted here that such policy was not applied by India in the case of Junagarh and Hyberabad state. India maintains that Kashmir had become a part of India when Kashmir’s ruler Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of Accession acceding Kashmir to India. Thus India’s claim on Kashmir is based on this legal document. On the other hand Pakistan contends that India is validating its occupation in Kashmir by claiming that the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir had opted for India by signing the Instrument of Accession. For India, Kashmir is an unfinished "agenda of partition" which can be fulfilled only after the areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Northern Gilgit and Baltistan are integrated with India. Furthermore, from India’s standpoint integration of Kashmir is important not only because of its strategic significance but also because its disintegration would have a spill over effect on other states leading to the balkanisation of the Indian Union. For Pakistan, the Kashmir issue is not only crucial for its religious ideology, but is also useful in raising the external threat of India ready to wage an armed conflict because of Kashmir. General Musharaf in a speech on January 12, 2002, summed up the centrality of Kashmir in Pakistan’s jihadi policy. He said, “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. The entire Pakistan and the world know this. We will continue to extend our moral, political, and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principal stand on Kashmir”. For Pakistan, Kashmir has far greater importance for economic, ethnic, and strategic reasons.

The World Community got involved in this matter when Kashmir Issue was referred to the UN Security Council by India as a complaint against Pakistan on 1 January 1948 in the wake of the invasion of tribe’s men in Kashmir. Pakistan filed a counter-complaint in the UN. In January 1949, the UN Security Council ordered cease-fire and passed resolution for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide the fate of Kashmir. Till date plebiscite could not take place in Kashmir. The resolution recommended Pakistan to withdraw all troops from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir as a pre-requisite for holding a plebiscite; Pakistan ignored the UN mandate, did not withdraw its troops and claimed the withdrawal of Indian forces was a pre-requisite as per this resolution. Kashmir attracts the global community from time to time, but no concrete steps have been taken to resolve the problem. This contested issue remains one of the crucial problems in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. The unresolved dispute has also been a major drain on the resources of the two countries and has been a stumbling block to normalizing relations between them.

In 1972 India and Pakistan signed Simla Agreement, by which both countries agreed to settle all issues by peaceful means using mutual dialogue in accordance with the UN charter. Pakistan’s efforts over the time to internationalize the Kashmir issue were not appreciated by India. India is demanding the issue to be resolved through bilateral negotiations as per the Simla agreement. Any attempt of third party intervention is widely criticized by India. In the post Simla agreement period, for International community Kashmir is rather a bilateral issue to be discussed at the negotiating table by India and Pakistan. The US position has also been to resolve the Kashmir dispute on the basis of the Simla Agreement. However, after the conduct of nuclear tests by both countries, the American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said that the US was "re-examining the underlying political problems between India and Pakistan including Kashmir." The dynamics of Kashmir rivalry has entered in to the new escalation-prone phase at the turn of the century. India and Pakistan went overtly nuclear in May 1998 when India conducted five nuclear tests and Pakistan responded by conducting six nuclear tests to match India’s number of nuclear explosions.

IV. Indo-Pak Relations in the Post 9/11 Era :

In a world forever changed by the infamous September 11 attacks, the most urgent threat to lasting peace is the growing mistrust between Pakistan and India. It is commonly understood that the tribal areas crisscrossing Afghanistan and Pakistan are a breeding ground for terrorists. India has grave concerns of the spill over of radical extremists from this region crossing into Kashmir region. The US response to the September 11 attacks confronted the political leadership of both Pakistan and India with unique challenges and opportunities. Pakistan had to quickly choose whether it would become an enemy of the U.S. and risk the expected consequences, or side with it, and confront its own Islamic-fundamentalist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It chose to side with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan decided to join because of predictable economic incentives, the need to save its strategic assets and salvaging its Kashmir policy from total destruction. India on its part was prompt in offering its support in the hope that it can fight it’s own cross-border terrorism against Pakistan, under the banner of US led ‘Global War on Terror’. India wanted the U.S. to categorize all Islamist resistance groups in Kashmir as "cross border terrorism" and it wanted endorsement for its efforts to crush them. But Indian aspirations were not realized by US to the expectation of India. India watched with concern as Pakistan again emerged as a frontline state in the U.S. led war in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan became the battle ground for the American led “Global War on Terrorism”, with Pakistan as an important ally of the US in Afghanistan. Tensions between long-time rivals in the region have bubbled beneath the surface in Afghanistan as ‘war on terror’ has captured most of the attention. India offered unconditional support to the US in the latter’s ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan with a view not only to minimize Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and ensure that Afghanistan does not become a source of terrorism against India but also with long-term geo-strategic interests including peace and security in the region.

India and Pakistan have been locked in a bitter rivalry with decades-old roots that have almost erupted into outright war several times. In the post-9/11 world, the threat is even greater as the conflict has, on multiple occasions, threatened to escalate into nuclear war. With the 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and the Mumbai attacks in 2008, relationship between the two countries got further worsened. India is accusing Pakistan for these attacks. On the other hand, Pakistan is accusing India for internal disturbances and insurgency insurrection in the tribal areas of Sind and Baluchistan. Both the countries are playing the war of misperceptions. Since 2014, a new terrorist group, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has emerged in the tribal areas of Pakistan to threaten Pakistan’s political institutions. The Pakistani leadership has often accused India of supplying arms and funding to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan who are resorting to terrorist acts against Pakistan, because of Pakistan’s support to the US war on terrorism. In the wake of recent military tensions between Pakistan-India over cross-border firings, it is of utmost importance to defuse tensions by bringing both sides together to discuss the impasse, leading to a resumption of a peace dialogue which has remained suspended since Mumbai attacks in 2008.

V. Role of Extra-Regional powers in Indo-Pak Conflict :

The dynamics of Great Power interests in the Indo- Pakistan conflict can be better understood by the extent to which global and regional powers have used each other to advance their respective political and strategic objectives. The US has played a significant role in Indo Pakistan relations. The US policies towards India and Pakistan are guided by its own interests in the region. During the Cold War period, the US sided with Pakistan on Kashmir to serve its own geo-political cold war interests. The US provided economic and military aid running into billions of dollars to Pakistan to sustain its war in Afghanistan against its rival power - USSR. It looked at the other way while Pakistan used the same money and equipment in sustaining its crusade of cross-border terrorism against India. Most of India’s security problems vis-à-vis Pakistan could be traced back to the US tilt towards Pakistan at the expense of India during the Cold War. Its policy towards India and Pakistan has always disrupted the balance of power in South Asia.

After the end of the Cold War and particularly in the post 9/11 era, many friends turned as foes and visa-versa. India came closer to the US. Both the countries felt that there is the need for security cooperation and the greatest threats to their security are defined more by dynamics with weak and failing states than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones. However, the US continued to deal with India and Pakistan separately within the frame work of its own interests in both the countries. On the objections by Pakistan, India was kept at arm’s length as far as the security issue in Afghanistan was concerned. India’s role in Afghanistan was restricted only to humanitarian assistance and economic development as was desired by Pakistan. The US needed Pakistan more than India because of Pakistan’s geographical location.

The U.S. is a fair-weather friend of Pakistan. With the emergence of China as a great power, the U.S. became closer to India. The US strategy is to promote India as a “counter -weight” to China, disappointing Pakistan. Pakistani regime provides pivotal assistance to Washington in securing its interests in Afghanistan- at the cost of turning much of Pakistan’s tribal regions into a war zone. Pakistan, which served as a U.S. Cold War proxy, now finds itself reduced to playing second fiddle to the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership. Pakistan is in fact complaining that the U.S. has encouraged India to play a major and growing role in Afghanistan, including in the training of Afghan security forces. The US relationship with Pakistan is looking increasingly fraught even as its relationship with India improves in the wake of the 2008 civilian nuclear deal.

As against US, China is all-weather friend of Pakistan. China provided a huge assistance to Pakistan in becoming a nuclear power. India perceives that the friendship between Pakistan and China is based on common dislike of both the countries for India. China’s friendship reached its peak during the Indo-Pakistan War in September 1965. China provided strong support to Pakistan by applying strong military pressure on India to stop the war. China had supported Pakistan on Kashmir which had acted as a second front against India with whom it had a border demarcation problem leading to war in 1962. China’s support for Pakistan in its conflict with India is a serious and ongoing source of tension in the Sino–Indian relationship. China is helping Pakistan not only militarily, but also economically. Pakistan has secured extensive Chinese assistance to build Gwadar port to secure a gateway for trade with Afghanistan and countries beyond. Islamabad seeks to strengthen its trade links with the CARs by controlling both new infrastructure and Silk Route’s traditional Western route that connects Karachi with markets in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

VI. Recent National Security Adviser Level Talks (NSA) :

India and Pakistan have employed different modes and techniques of conflict management and resolution from bilateral negotiations to mediation and arbitration. None of these measures have helped them resolve their differences. Zartman’s ripeness theory suggests a right time to begin negotiations to resolve differences between or among conflicting parties. India and Pakistan in this context seized the moment and tried to seek the suggested way out (negotiations) but could not settle their mutual differences.

There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts and meetings between the two countries at the highest levels to resolve various aspects of their conflict. The continuing conflict between India and Pakistan can be seen through the ripeness model. There have been at least four cases in which India and Pakistan realized that the ripe moment has arrived- the Tashkent Agreement 1965, Simla agreement 1972, Lahore Declaration 1999 and Agra Summit 2001. Measures were taken during these efforts after calculating costs and benefits by India and Pakistan. Both the countries have realized the need to resolve their bilateral conflict. But it could not bring about any long lasting or permanent settlement to their conflict.

India and Pakistan resumed the composite dialogue in June 2004 that covered eight baskets of issues agreed upon in Male in 1997 between the former Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The eight baskets of issues are as follows: 1.Peace and Security including CBMs 2. Jammu and Kashmir 3. Siachin 4. Wullar Barrage/Tylbul Navigation Project 5. Sir Creek 6.Economic and Commercial Cooperation 7.Terrorism and Drug-Trafficking and 8. Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields. The outcome of this composite dialogue process has so far not been dramatic, except some progress on CBMs, drug-trafficking, and promotion of friendly exchanges. Recently, the Prime ministers of Pakistan and India met in Ufa (Russia) on the side lines of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) summit on 10th July 2015. The leaders exchanged views on issues of bilateral and regional interest. Both the leaders agreed that India and Pakistan have a collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development. Both leaders condemned terrorism in all its forms and agreed to cooperate with each other to eliminate this menace from South Asia. They also agreed on the following steps to be taken by the two sides in Ufa meeting:

⏹ A meeting in New Delhi between the two NSAs to discuss all issues connected to terrorism.
⏹ Early meetings of DG BSF and DG Pakistan Rangers followed by that of DGMOs (Directors General Military Operations).

⏹ Decision for release of fishermen in each other‟s custody, along with their boats, within a period of 15 days.
⏹ Mechanism for facilitating religious tourism.

⏹ Both sides agreed to discuss ways and means to expedite the Mumbai case trial, including additional information like providing voice samples

Pakistani Government officials wanted to meet separatist Hurriyat representatives of Kashmir in New Delhi. India reacted with great opposition. India wanted discussion of conflicting issues between them strictly according to the Simla agreement. For India, any third party on the table goes against Simla Agreement. BothIndia and Pakistan are taking what is regarded as an extreme or rigid position at the negotiating table, by which permanent settlement of disputes could never happen between them. Pakistan wanted to talk on all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, but India wants to talk on cross-border terrorism coming from Pakistan. Pursuant to the meeting between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif in Paris on November 30, 2015 Indian and Pakistani National Security Advisers met for talks in Bangkok on 6 December 2015. This meeting was kept secret till it got over and the discussions covered “peace and security, terrorism, Jammu and Kashmir, and other issues, including tranquility along the LoC.”

VIII. Conclusion :

The relations between India and Pakistan have been in a state of constant flux, ever since their independence. They have fought four wars. Military confrontation between them has been the reason for other developmental and economic issues being pushed in to the back ground. Needless to say South Asian countries constitute over 40% of the global poverty and need enormous resources and efforts to eliminate the scourge of poverty but unprecedented defence expenditure has prevented both India and Pakistan to do that. Security issues continued to remain the pivot around which countries of the region have shaped their national and regional policies.

In an increasingly interdependent world, we see regional cooperation as the best venue to reduce tension, resolve conflict and to succeed in the competitive markets in our global village. Individual nation-state can only survive and prosper only by integrating into regional cooperation mechanisms. The model of the European Union is an encouraging and inspiring one. We cannot dare to compare the intra trade of SAARC with the European Union. The intra trade of EU is 63.4%, while SAARC internal trade, could not cross the level of 3.4%, due to high tariffs, hostilities between nations, lack of common customs union and absence of harmonized commercial processes. Replicating the experience of the EU in our region is a huge challenge but not an impossible task. In this context, serious and sustained commitment, planning, and efforts by all countries of the region are necessary. Peace and stability are pre-requisites for economic development, trade and politico-socio-cultural relations.

There is a huge potential for the expansion of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pak relationship has not reached a stage yet where the economic logic takes precedence over the political differences between the two countries. The existing barriers that restrict the movement of people, goods and investment within and across the region, need to be dismantled to unlock the development potential of South Asia. It should be possible for the two dominant South Asian countries to convert the entire Indo-Pak border into soft border.

Both countries need to engage in continuous dialogue process so that gradual and steady progress could be made in resolving their contentious and intractable issues. There is no other alternative to continuous dialogue process. Political will and seriousness on both sides of the border is essential to usher in peace between the two countries.

Relation Between Indian and Bangaladesh :

Introduction :

Bangladesh and India are South Asian neighbors. Generally relations have been friendly, although sometimes there are border disputes. The historic land boundary agreement was signed on 6 June 2015 which opened a new era in the relations and further stopped all irritants in ties. They are common members of SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA and the Commonwealth. In particular, Bangladesh and the East Indian states of West Bengal and Tripura are Bengali-speaking. Bangladesh has a high commission in New Delhi with consulates in Mumbai and Kolkata. India has a high commission in Dhaka with a consulate in Chittagong. In a survey, 70% percent of Bangladeshis expressed a favorable opinion and perception of India. Historically and culturally the two nations have been considerably close to each other.

History :

India's links with Bangladesh are civilization, cultural, social and economic. There is much that unites the two countries – a shared history and common heritage, linguistic and cultural ties, passion for music, literature and the arts. The two nations were strong allies during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. However, they developed different Cold War alliances in the late 1970s and 80s. With the onset of economic liberalization in South Asia, they forged greater bilateral engagement and trade. The historic Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was concluded in 1996. India and Bangladesh are close strategic partners in counter-terrorism. They are also the largest trading partners in South Asia. Two-way trade is estimated to be over US $7 billion.

Main Areas of contention :

1. A major area of contention has been the construction and operation of the Farakka Barrage by India to increase water supply in the river Hoogly. Bangladesh insists that it does not receive a fair share of the Ganges waters during the drier seasons, and gets flooded during the monsoons when India releases excess waters. 

2. There have also been disputes regarding the transfer of Teen Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh. Part of Bangladesh is surrounded by the Indian state of West Bengal. On 26 June 1992, India leased three bigha land to Bangladesh to connect this enclave with mainland Bangladesh. There was a dispute regarding the indefinite nature of the lease. The dispute was resolved by an mutual agreement between India and Bangladesh in 2011.

3. Terrorist activities carried out by outfits based in both countries, like Banga Sena and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. Recently India and Bangladesh had agreed jointly to fight terrorism.

4. Bangladesh has consistently denied India transit facility to the landlocked North Eastern Regions of India. Although India has a narrow land link to this North eastern region, which is famously known as the Siliguri Corridor or "India's Chicken Neck"

5. Illegal Bangladeshi immigration into India. The border is porous and migrants are able to cross illegally, though sometimes only in return for financial or other incentives to border security personnel. Bangladeshi officials have denied the existence of Bangladeshis living in India and those illegal migrants found are described as having been trafficked. This has considerable repercussions for those involved, as they are stigmatized for having been involved in prostitution, whether or not this has actually been the case. Cross border migrants are also at far higher risk of HIV/Aids infection.

6. Continuous border killing of Indian and Bangladeshi people, aiding illegal immigrants, helping in armed dacoity, fake money transfer and illegal drug trades by both Indian and Bangladeshi people are the major problems between Bangladesh and India.

7. Both Bangladesh and India make claims over the same seawater at the Bay of Bengal before settlement of the issue.

8. There was a minor glitch in their relation when former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh accidentally mentioned that 25% of Bangladeshis are anti-Indian, during an informal press meet.

Border killings of Bangladeshi civilians:

Deaths of Bangladeshi citizens in the Indo-Bangladesh border became one of the embarrassments between the two nation’s bilateral relations in recent years. The so-called ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy by India’s Border Security Forces (BSF) that according to Human Rights Watch killed nearly 1,000 Bangladeshis between 2001 and 2011 has remained at the core of the talks between Bangladeshi and Indian officials visiting each other.

The Bangladeshi deaths caused by BSF shootings at the border became subject to a so-called cyber war between the hackers of the two countries that took the websites of BSF, National Informatics Centre and Trinamool Congress as victims. The government of Bangladesh was found to comment on the issue condemning the cyber attacks on Indian websites.

Recent developments:

In September 2011, the two countries signed a major accord on border demarcation to end the 4-decade old disputes over boundaries. This came to be known as the tin bigha corridor. India also granted 24-hour access to Bangladeshi citizens in the Tin Bigha Corridor. The agreement included exchange of adversely held enclaves, involving 51,000 people spread over 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladesh enclaves in India. The total land involved is reportedly 7000 acres.

On 9 October 2011, Indian and Bangladeshi armies participated in Sampriti-II (Unity-II), a 14-day-long Joint military exercise at Sylhet to increase synergy between their forces.

In 2012, Bangladesh allowed India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation to ferry heavy machinery, turbines and cargo through Ashuganj for Palatana Power project in southern Tripura.

From October 2013, India started exporting 500 megawatts of electricity a day to Bangladesh over a period of 35 years. A 125-kilometre Baharampur-Bheramara transmission line, 40 km of it in Bangladesh, connects the two substations. Bangladesh officials believe the export would greatly ease the national shortage once 500 MW flows into the national grid.

Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Bangladesh in her first official overseas trip in June, 2014. On 7 May 2015 the Indian Parliament, in the presence of Bangladeshi diplomats, unanimously passed the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) as its 100th Constitutional amendment, thereby resolving all 68-year old border disputes since the end of the British Raj. The bill was pending ratification since the 1974 Mujib-Indira accords.

In June 2014, during her first official overseas visit, Foreign Minister of India, Sushma Swaraj concluded various agreements to boost ties. They include:

·    Easing of Visa regime to provide 5 year multiple entry visas to minors below 13 and elderly above 65.

·         Proposal of a special economic zone in Bangladesh.

·         Agreement to send back a fugitive murder accused from India.

·         Provide an additional 100 MW power from Tripura.

·       Increase the frequency of Maitree Express and start buses between  Dhaka  and  Guwahati  and  Shillong.

·       Bangladesh allowed India to ferry food and grains to the landlocked Northeast India's using its territory and infrastructure. 

During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's state visit to Bangladesh during June 2015 as many as 22 agreements were signed by two sides. During the visit India extended a US$2 billion line of credit to Bangladesh & pledged US$5 billion worth of investments. As per the agreements, India's Reliance Power agreed to invest US$3 billion to set up a 3,000 MW LNG-based power plant & Adani Power will be setting up a 1600 MW coal-fired power plant at a cost of US$1.5 billion. The two countries signed a total of 22 agreements including the ones on maritime safety co-operation and curbing human trafficking and fake Indian currency. Modi also announced a line of credit of $2 billion to Bangladesh.

At midnight on 31 July 2015, around 50,000 people became citizens of India or Bangladesh after living in limbo for decades. Ending a prolonged dispute, the two nations swapped 162 enclaves on the border region, allowing the people living there to stay or opt out to the other country. While 14,214 citizens of Bangladesh residing in 51 enclaves on the Indian side became Indians, a large number of people in the 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh preferred to stay with Bangladesh and just 979 opted to move to India. The total number of new Indian citizens will be 15,193.

Energy cooperation :

India has recently introduced the concept of the Regional Power Trading System which will help various regions of the country in reducing the power deficit by transferring surplus power from another region. Under the Electricity Act 2003, the Indian companies could pool power in an exchange. A consumer would be free to buy it from anyone. This can ultimately form a regional power pool thereby generating a huge opportunity for power trading in the region.

India is also looking to export electricity from its north-eastern region with potential to generate some 58,971 Mega Watt to its eastern States through Bangladesh. Bangladesh hopes to have access to Nepal and Bhutan’s power through India. Bangladesh has formally requested a ‘power corridor’ to access the Bhutanese and Nepalese markets. It has agreed to allow India to transfer hydroelectricity from Assam to Bihar through its territory. The proposed meeting would attempt to remove irritants in project-related areas.

Development cooperation:

India is very active in development activity in Bangladesh.

India has recently given several loans to Bangladesh. It gave $750 million for developing Bangladesh infrastructure in 2011.

In 2014 India extended a $1 billion soft loan for infrastructure development.

Lines of Credit

$1 billion was given for the Padma Bridge which World Bank refused. $862 million was given to buy equipment and services from Indian entities such as BHEL, RITES, small and medium enterprises.

Small development projects

India announced a grant of nearly $10 million to Bangladesh for the implementation of various small development projects and also assured it to address trade imbalance issues.

Health

         India and Bangladesh signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the fields of health and medical sciences that will include joint research in health and exchange of doctors and health professionals. The MoU is aimed at promoting cooperation between the two countries in the fields of health and medical sciences through exchange of scientific materials and information and joint collaboration in research in medical science.

Trade and investment :

The two way trade is $7 billion. The trade is set to go at $10 billion by 2018 through ports. India is second in import destination for Bangladesh. Bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh stood at USD 6.6 billion in 2013-14 with India's exports at USD 6.1 billion and imports from Bangladesh at USD 462 million, representing more than double the value of USD 2.7 billion five years ago.

Bangladesh Cabinet has approved a revised trade deal with India under which the two nations would be able to use each other's land and water routes for sending goods to a third country, removing a long-standing barrier in regional trade. Under the deal India would also be able to send goods to Myanmar through Bangladesh. It incorporated a provision that the deal would be renewed automatically after five years if either of the countries did not have any objection.

Sharing the water of the Ganges :

          The sharing of the Ganges waters between India and Bangladesh over the appropriate allocation and development of the water resources of the Ganges River that flows from northern India into Bangladesh. The issue has remained a subject of conflict for almost 35 years, with several bilateral agreements and rounds of talks failing to produce results.

However, a comprehensive bilateral treaty was signed by the ex Indian Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda and the then-Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed on December 12, 1996 in the Indian capital of New Delhi. The treaty established a 30-year water-sharing arrangement and recognized Bangladesh's rights as a lower-level riparian.

Background :

Descending from India's northern plains, the Ganges river forms a boundary of 129 kilometres between India and Bangladesh and flows for 113 km in Bangladesh. At Pakaur in India, the river begins its attrition with the branching away of its first distributary, the Bhagirathi River, which goes on to form the Hooghly River. About 10 kilometres from the border with Bangladesh the Farakka Barrage, built in 1974, controls the flow of the Ganges, diverting some of the water into a feeder canal linking the Hooghly to keep it relatively silt-free.

After entering Bangladesh, the main branch of the Ganges is known as the Padma River until it is joined by the Jamuna River, the largest distributary of the Brahmaputra River, which descends from Assam and Northeast India. Further downstream, the Ganges is fed by the Meghna River, the second-largest distributary of the Brahmaputra, and takes on the Meghna's name as it enters the Meghna estuary. Fanning out into the 350 km wide Ganges Delta, it finally empties into the Bay of Bengal. A total of 54 rivers flow into Bangladesh from India.

Efforts at resolution:

The ex Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Bangladesh's founding leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signed the wide-ranging Indo-Bangladeshi Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace on March 19, 1972; as per the treaty, the two nations established a Joint River Commission to work for the common interests and sharing of water resources,   irrigation,  floods  and  cyclones  control.

Farakka Barrage:

The Farakka Barrage is a dam on the Bhagirathi river located in the Indian state of West Bengal, roughly 10 km (6.2 mi) from the border with Bangladesh. India uses it to control the flow of the Ganges river. The dam was built to divert the Ganges River water into the Hooghly River during the dry season, from January to June, in order to flush out the accumulating silt which in the 1950s and 1960s was a problem at the Kolkata Port on the Hooghly River. Bangladesh claims that its rivers were drying up because of excess drawing of water by India. In May 1974 a joint declaration was issued to resolve the water–sharing issue before the Farakka Barrage began operation. This was followed by an interim agreement in 1975 to allow India to operate feeder canals of the barrage for short periods.

However, India withdrew from the process of negotiations by September 1976 as both nations grew apart after the killing of Sheikh Mujib and establishment of military rule. Bangladesh protested India's unilateral action at a summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and at the 31st session of the U.N. General Assembly. At the urging of other nations and the U.N., both India and Bangladesh agreed to resume dialogue, but with no results.

Temporary agreements :

Bilateral relations had improved in 1977 during the governments of the then-Prime Minister Morarji Desai of India and the then-President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh; in 1977 both leaders signed a 5-year treaty on water-sharing, but this duly expired in 1982 without being renewed.

       Bangladesh attempted to internationalize the affair by lobbying the U.N. General Assembly and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) without result at all.

1996 Treaty :  

        The formation of an Awami League government under Sheikh Hasina Wajed, the daughter of Sheikh Mujib, in 1996 led to a fresh thaw in bilateral relations and both nations’ restarted negotiations. Both leaders met in the Indian capital on December 12, 1996 and signed a 30-year, comprehensive treaty.

Both nations were able to cooperate in harnessing the water resources; the treaty also permits the construction of barrages and irrigation projects in Kushtia and the Gorai-Madhumati River in Bangladesh, draining the southwestern districts and thus preserving the environment, natural and economic resources.

Assessment :

The 1996 treaty established a long-term solution and considerably eased the strains in Indo-Bangladeshi relations. The 1996 treaty has been attacked by the Awami League's main rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is regarded as hostile to India, but it did not renege from the treaty when it came to power in 2001. The BNP and other Bangladeshi political factions allege that India is drawing excessive water and the amount allocated to Bangladesh is unjust and insufficient. India in turn complains that the water allocated to Bangladesh leaves it with less water than necessary for the functioning of the Kolkata Port and the National Thermal Power Corporation in Farakka.

Other critics have also stressed environmental reasons for India to reconsider its drawing of water at Farraka. Alarming increases in deforestation and erosion at the upper levels of the Ganges river increases the deposition of silt at the lower level, which is already measured at 2 million tonnes annually, along with increased salinity have also led to desertification. In Bangladesh, the diversion has raised salinity levels, contaminated fisheries, hindered navigation and posed a threat to water quality and public health. Such silt levels are believed to be adversely affecting the Hooghly river and the Kolkata Port.

Tin Bigha Corridor :

The Tin (or Teen) Bigha Corridor is a strip of land belonging to India on the West Bengal–Bangladesh border which, in September 2011, was leased to Bangladesh so that it can access its Dahagram–Angarpota enclaves.

History :

According to the Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Mujibur Rahman treaty of 16 May, 1974, India and Bangladesh were to hand over the sovereignty of the Tin Bigha Corridor (178 by 85 metres (584 ft × 279 ft)) and South Berubari (7.39 km2 (2.85 sq mi)) to each other, thereby allowing access to the Dahagram–Angarpota enclaves and the Indian enclaves adjacent to South Berubari. Bangladesh did hand over the sovereignty of the smaller South Berubari to India instantly in 1974. India, however, could not transfer the Tin Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh as it required constitutional amendment which could not be done due to political reasons.

After much Bangladesh government protest, India, instead of handing over sovereignty in 2011, proposed to lease the Tin Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh for a certain time. South Berubari, meanwhile, would remain in the possession of India.

The total area of South Berubari Union No. 12 is 22.58 km2 (8.72 sq mi) of which 11.29 km2 (4.36 sq mi) was to go to Bangladesh. The area of the four Cooch Behar enclaves which would also have to go to Bangladesh was 6.84 km2 (2.64 sq mi) making the total area to be transferred 18.13 km2(7.00 sq mi). The population of the area including the four enclaves to be transferred, as per 1967 data, was 90% Hindu. The Bangladesh enclaves, Dahagram and Angorpota, were to be transferred to India. Their total area was 18.68 km2 (7.21 sq mi) and as per 1967 data more than 80% of their population was Muslim. If this exchange had gone through, it would have meant a change of nationality for the population or migration of the population from Dahagram and Angorpota and South Berubari Union No. 12 and consequent serious rehabilitation problems. There were in any case major agitations by the people of Berubari protesting against the transfer.

After 1971, India proposed to Bangladesh that India may continue to retain the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves and, in exchange, Dahagram and Angorpota may be retained by Bangladesh. As part of the package a strip of land would be leased in perpetuity by India to Bangladesh, giving her access to Dahagram & Angorpota in order to enable her to exercise sovereignty on these two enclaves. This was accepted by Bangladesh as part of a carefully constructed Land Boundary Agreement signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in May 16, 1974. The Berubari dispute was thus finally resolved by Article 1.14 of the Agreement which stated:

"India will retain the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves, measuring an area of 6.8 km2 (2.64 sq mi) approximately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 by 85 metres (584 ft × 279 ft) near 'Tin Bigha' to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh."

Etymology

Tin is the word for the numeral "three" in Bengali, and bigha is a unit of area ranging from 1,500 to 6,771 m2(16,150–72,880 sq ft).

Access to corridor

The corridor was previously open for 12 daylight hours only, causing great hardships for the inhabitants of the enclave, given the fact that the enclave has no hospitals or law enforcement facilities.

Following a treaty signed by the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh on September 6, 2011 in Dhaka, it was agreed that the corridor would be open for 24 hours for Bangladeshis in the enclave to access the mainland.

The corridor was officially declared open by the Bangladesh Premier Sheikh Hasina on October 19, 2011.

Infrastructure

Until recently, the enclaves had no hospitals or colleges. Bangladesh Premier Sheikh Hasina inaugurated a ten-bed Dahagram Hospital and the Dahagram Union Parishad Complex on October 19, 2011.

Indo-Bangla Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace:

The India-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace was a 25-year treaty that was signed on March 19, 1972 forging close bilateral relations between India and the newly established state of Bangladesh. The treaty was also known as the Indira-Mujib Treaty, after the signatories of the treaty the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi and the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Background :

During the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, India provided extensive aid, training and shelter for the exiled government of Bangladesh and Bengali nationalist Mukti Bahini guerrilla force that was fighting the Pakistani Army. Between 8 and 10 million refugees poured into India during 1971, increasing tensions between India and Pakistan. At the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Joint Force including regular army of Bangladesh, Mukti Bahini and the Indian Military liberated then East Pakistan, leading to the establishment of Bangladesh. India's role in the independence of Bangladesh led to the development of strong bilateral relations. Then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi spoke along with Bangladesh's founding leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman before more than 500,000 people at Suhrawardy Udyan in Dhaka.

Provisions :

The twelve Articles incorporated in the treaty were:

(i) The contracting parties solemnly declare that there shall be lasting peace and friendship between the two countries and each side shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other side;

(ii) The contracting parties condemn colonialism and racialism of all forms, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination;

(iii) The contracting parties reaffirm their faith in the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence as important factors for easing tension in the world, maintaining international peace and security and strengthening national sovereignty and independence;

(iv) The contracting parties shall maintain regular contacts and exchange views with each other on major international problems affecting the interest of both the states;

(v) The contracting parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually advantageous and all round cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical fields, and shall develop mutual cooperation in the fields of trade, transport and communication on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit;

(vi) The contracting parties agree to make joint studies and take joint action in the field of flood control, river basin development and development of hydro-electric power and irrigation;

(vii) Both the parties shall promote relations in the field of arts, literature, education, culture, sports and health;

(viii) In accordance with the ties of friendship existing between the two countries, each of the contracting parties solemnly declare that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party. Each of the parties shall refrain from any aggression against the other party and shall not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to or continue to threat to the security of the other contracting parties;

(ix) Each of the contracting parties shall refrain from giving any assistance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In case if either party is attacked or threatened to attack, the contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take necessary measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their countries;

(x) Each of the parties solemnly declare that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, towards one or more states which may be incompatible with the present treaty;

(xi) The present treaty is signed for a term of twenty-five years, and shall be renewed by mutual agreement;

(xii) Any differences interpreting any Article of the treaty shall be settled on a bilateral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

Expiration of the treaty :

The two governments declined to renegotiate or renew the treaty when it approached expiry in 1997. Although initially received enthusiastically by both nations, the treaty with India became the subject of resentment and controversy in Bangladesh, where people saw it as unequal and an imposition of excessive Indian influence. Issues such as the dispute over water resources of the Farakka Barrage and India's perceived delayed withdrawal of troops began to diminish the spirit of friendship. Sheikh Mujib's pro-India policies antagonised many in politics and the military. Assassination of Mujib in 1975 led to the establishment of military regimes that sought to distance the country from India.

Mujib's death led to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Pakistan and other nations that had opposed the creation of Bangladesh, such as Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of China. Bangladesh was criticised for allowing Indian secessionist groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) to operate from bases on its territory, and Bangladeshi intelligence agencies were suspected of maintaining links with Pakistan's intelligence agencies. Bangladesh in turn alleged that India was supporting the Shanti Bahini insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.